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4. The Church's Bid for Intellectual Leadership 
We have already noted the Church's claim to teach "in all 
its fulness every doctrine that men ought to be brought to know, 
and that regarding things visible and invisible, in heaven and 
on earth . " During the Dark Ages it was too busy with other 
~oblems to be able to concern itself much with education. 
~ile there were sporadic attempts earlier, it was only during 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries that the Church turned more 
seriously to the problem of educating its members . This work ~ 
was carried on primarily in the monastery and cathedral schools. 
But, because the monasteries of this time were mainly concerned 
with their own internal problems of reform, and because they 
were ill-equipped to take care of students who might not be 
monastically minded, the work of education fell mainly on such 
cathedral schools as those at Canterbury, Paris, Chartres, and 
To led~ 
Lfhe curriculum of these schools included the trivium (tri-
ple way) and the quadrivium w.g ich, when taken together, were . 
called the seven liberal arts . Grammar, rhetoric, and logic made 
up the former . Arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music m~ae~ 
up the latter . The textual materials which were used were of et 
two major types . There were the encyclopedic compilations with P1 
their commentaries, as well as various odd bits of material · ~ 
which had in common only the fact that most of tpem had been ~;:;~ 
preserved by the early medieval Neoplatonists . These odd bitSIV/~~ · 
included Roman textbooks on grammar, rhetoric, and science; a ~ 
part of Plato's Timaeus; and parts of some of Aristotle's works 
on logic. A curriculum based on such materials was ill-equipped 
to meet the demands that were soon to be m~de upon ~ > 
1TI1ere were two major factors which helped to change these 
earl,-schools into what we know today as the medieval universi-
ties. One was the demand made by the Church and the rising V 
states and cities for an enlarged understanding of legal theory 
and practice commensurate with their expanding administrations. 
The other factor was the appearance from obscure beginnings of 
a_r£.;_~ ;?_dj~ ,_-t£:, ~~ y:;~y ~ 
~~~z$--41,~. .. J . . / d~_/ &IPLJJ;r~/~ ~ kf~~· r~ ~~~J 
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new materials, wllich eventually superseded the or§} Before the 
Crusades there was a r evival of interest in Roman law and medi-
cine in the older Italian schools . There were also some points 
of contact with the Moslem East through Spain and Sicily, wh~ch 
the Crusades ser ved to expand. Most important ' of the Italian 
contributions were the commentary on civil law made by Irnerius 
( c . 1050 - c . 1130) and Gratian's digest of canon law, called 
t he Concord of Discordant Canons. Some of the more important 
mater ials which came from elsewhere were: Aver-roes' Canon of 
Medicine, Ar abic arithmetic (including Arabic numerals whiGn-
were a gr eat impr ovement over the old Roman numerals), Euclid's 
wor ks on geometry, Ptolemy's Almagest, and the medical works of· 
Hippocrates and Galen. 
To meet the new demands of church, state, and city with 
the new materials the universities were founded. Some of them 
were the outgrowth of the cathedral schools, others simply 
sprang up in t he places where outstanding teachers were trans-
l at ing, dis c ssing, and interpreting these works. At first the 
u n iversities tended to ·specialize in one subject. This meant 
that the early medieval students were forced to wander from 
place to place in search of the new knowledge. Later the uni-
versities came to offer a more com let ·on, the studium 
generale as it was called . 
By the thirteenth century the map of Europe was fairly well 
dotted with universities whose names have come down to us today: 
Salerno, Bologna, Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, Montpellier, Tou-
louse, and Salamanca, to name but a few. Later schools were 
sometimes founded by the secession of students or faculty from 
existi ng institutions, or by the action of the Church or of 
secular rulers . Between the schools in Italy and those in the 
northe r n part of Europe there was an interesting difference. 
The Italian students were generally older and more interested 
in p r ofessional training, much like the graduate students of 
t oday. They created their own organization which made the rules 
f o r academic · matters, down to such details as exactly how the 
maste r s shou ld deliver their lectures . The Italian masters 
countered with an organization of their own to work with the 
students . In the North, where the students tended to be younger, 
the master s had an easier time dominating the academic scene. 
~ 1 500 there were more than seventy universities in Europe. ~ 
They r epresent another of the major contributions of the Middle 
Ages to Wes t ern Civilizatio~ 
·he structure of the universities was similar to that of 
t he other bodies within the organism of medieval society. There 
were the various degrees, which we still use today: scholar, 
bachelor, master, and doctor; corresponding to those within the 
guilds : apprentice, journeyman, and master. Usually the bach-
elor 's degree meant that one had completed the trivium, and the 
master's degree that one had completed the quadrivium. To re-
ceive a doctor's degree a student had to spend several more years 
in s u ch special subjects as law, medicine, or theology. The 
1 ~~w~h~':t~~~7~ T~ r ?e() ~~~~, ~-~HJ~· 
( 
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advanced degrees of master and doctor conferred on one the 
r i ght and the r esponsibility to teach -- hence the original 
meaning of the word "commencement." To the sacerdotium and L-
regnum there could now be added as a major element of the medi-
eval landscape the studiu~ 
~e medieval scholars, or schoolmen (scholastici), were the 
source of what we know as scholasticism, the teaching of the 
medieval universities . The way of teaching developed in these 
schools determined the very nature of scholasticism. The teach-
ers read f r om what few books they had and commented on them. 
Their lectures were taken down by the students in the form of 
no t es which were later reworked in company with other students. 
In addition to taking examinations, the students were called 
upon to engage in disputation~, in which both sides of each ~ 
question would be argued . The attendant freedom of discussion, 
limited to the universities, served to balance the less creative 
wor k of note and e x ami nation. taki ng . The high points of univer-
s ity life were the debates between the masters and doctors 
t hemselves on the mor e important questions of the day. "Nothing 
is known perfectly," wrote Robert of Sorbonf'l 1201-~74) , "which 
has not ~-=~ated )l~ }h~_ tee~h _qf disputatio . ~dZi'.,,...k ~ ,_. •. zx.;tT~tuJ ~~e:.:.;~~ ~ ~ ~a. ..z . 
-7--In t e process of these disputation there would be much ~
qu oting from ancient authorities. One of the major sources for 
such quotations was the Sic et Non (Yes and No) , of Peter Abelard 
( 1079-1142) . This was a comj)TlatTon<>I various· authorities, _ill 
of them arranged on opposite sides of such major questions as 
hose concern1ng · sacramen s w e er 
supported b human reason and whether onl Eve, 
am, was eguiled in the den. Abelard's 
e 1 e sug ests , came to no conclusion because of 
his belief hat "b dalbting we come o 1n u1r , an inquiry 
we perceive the truth . ecause of their reliance on :autho rity 
and their almost complete lack of reference to experience, these 
debates may appear ludicrous to us today . This is particularly 
true when the scholars decided how many teeth a horse should have 
without looking into t he mouth of a single horse. Because of the 
deprecatory attitude toward experience, the disputation was the 
means by which any questi n was finally decided. 
~ ~ ~ ~~ 
is method o learning did have certain very important 
advantages . It served to make past knowledge available as a 
common tradition for all scholars . It served to make them aware 
of the importance of language and sensitive. to the meanings of 
words. It served to develop a lively concern for logical con- ~ 
sistency . And it helped to produce minds that were sharp and 
agile, quick to see inconsistencies and weaknesses in their op-
ponents' arguments. Minds so rained ould be and were eventu-
al! tur d to problems other than those which concerned the 
early schoolmen ) f~~7..e..Ma/~~~~ 
~out 1200 the whole body of Aristotelian writings began 
to be available in Europe . In addition to the complete logic 
( 
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there finally appeared his works on scie~e, ethics, politics, 
rhetoric, metaphysics, and aesthetics. L!hile this material 
supplied a body of integrated thought, it also represented a 
challenge to the thought of the times. Now, for the first ~ 
time, Western Christendom was faced with a complete and self-
sufficient body of ideas based on reason alone, and having no 
place for faith or revelation in any form whateve~ There was 
no Christ or church in Aristotelian thought . Clearly , here was 
a challenge to the intellectual supremacy of tbe Church which 
could not be avoide~ 
Before we come to the ways in which the Church tried to 
meet this challenge, we must note that there were reasons why 
it was not completely satisfied with the state of philosophical 
thought at this time. The thought of Augustine had been broken 
up in the centuries that followed his death. One strand had 
taken the form of a success religion, whi c h guaranteed worldly 
success to Christ i an believers. Another strand followed the 
appr oach of Gregory the Great in emphasizing the necessity for 
outward conformity to Church regulations. A third strand had 
taken a definitely mystical turn, one whi ch tended to see the 
Church as something less than necessary for man's salvation. 
r,;.:oplatonism was perhaps the most prominent school of thou~ during the twelfth century. But as then being used it 
had serious weaknesses. In the first place, its concept of the 
world's emanating from God tended to discount the Christian 
idea of creation. In the second place, and closely related to 
emanation, there was the idea that because God was intimately 
related to the world in the form of the Logos, it might be pos-
sible to work one's way up to Him without benefit of church or V 
faith. Thirdly, as the Logos operated by means of the universal 
forms, there was always a tendency for the forms to absorb the 
individual thing or person into the universal and reduce it to 
nothing but a specimen or illustration of the universal. Finally, 
there was always a strong mystical tendency in Neoplatonism. 
These reasons help to explain why neither it nor Augustin~ism 
satisfied completely many thinkers of the High Middle Age~ 
~ere were at least two reasons why the thought of Aristotle 
represented a challenge to these same thinkers. First, this 
material had come from the hands of infidels and unbelievers --
Moslems, Greeks, and Jews . Secondly, it was clearly not in har-
mony with Christian teaching at certain major points. Aristotle 
taught the eternity of the world, which was contrary to the ~ 
Christian insistence on its creation. As we have already noted, 
there was no room in his thought for faith or the Church. Fur-
ther, his interpretat i on of the active part of man's mind as 
nothing but a part of the universal Mind, even though he called 
the larger Mind God, seemed a clearcut denial of both man's in-
dividuality and immortality. · 
t(he Church's first reaction was to QQlldemn 
Aristotle, and to prohibit some of his works from 
iJVJMI -r- 4--dLe~ d~~· ~~ -~ ~<¥-~CIU''/ 
.EL..tllm h t 0 f 
being taught 
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in the schoo}s. was nec-
essary to find a dif e n way o ac ~ng the problem. A 
second alternative was that suggested by Averro s (1126-1198), 
a Moslem physician and philosopher who 1 ved in Spain.~is was 
the kind of answer that is often given even today to tne ques-
tion of the relation of science and religion. Islam, because 
of its similarity to Christianity in such things as creation 
and revelation, had almost the same problem when faced with the 
thought of Aristotle. Averroes saw the p oblem i n terms of the 
relation of hiloso hy and theo o because the former, as it--
was e ~ned at this t~me, included within it all science. And (7~/the based his answer to the problem on the assumption that there V were two ki th , one philosophical and the other the~-log~ca . ~s solution carne o e ca e t e octrine of double truth. It was loudly proclaimed at the University of Paris and ~ 
widely accepted because it appeared to do justice to both sides 
of the debate. However, it could readily be pointed out that 
this solution was neither good Christianity nor good Aristotel-
ianism, both of which, albeit from different starting points, 
held that t omehow one a any -- not even two. 
The Averroist dualism denied the unity of truth and ence, ~n 
logical terms, its very knowability. From a religious point of 
view such an interpretation made a shambles of the Christian 
insistence that God was one and sovereign. Averroism was there-
fore unacceptable to many thinke~ 
L!he third alternative which was suggested as a solution to 
the problem of the relation of philosophy and theology was that 
of the Dominicans, and especially of St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-
1274). Born to a noble Italian family and educated at Monte 
Cassino and the University of Naples, he joined the Dominican 
Order against the wishes of his family . The greatest of the 
Dominican teachers, Albertus Magnus (c. 1206 - 1280), took him 
under his wing, first as pupil and then as colleague. Aquinas' 
life was spent almost entirely in writing and teaching: in 
Cologne, Paris, Rome, and Naples. His most influential teaching 
was done at the University of Paris, where he was sent in ac-
cordance with the Dominican policy of placing as many of their 
members as possible in the universities . It was the subsequent 
clash between Thomism and Averroism which lifted that university ~ 
to the peak of its importance. Despi t e the fact that he was im-
mediately criticised for accepting too much of Aristotle,~ 
made good use of the hiloso her's reason to prove the existence 
o o ~n such a way as to bring reason to the s rv~ce o aith. 
His writings include two major works, the Summa contra Gentiles 
(Summary against the Gentiles), written between 1259 and 1264, 
and the Summa TheOIOgica (Summary of Theology). The latter was 
begun about 1265, and although it ran to twenty-one volumes, .it 
was not completed when Aquinas died, in 1274, while on his way 
to the Council of Lyons. Some hint of his significance can be 
gathered from the fact that he was canonized in 1323, and that 
his work was declared basic for its theology by the Roman Cath-
olic church in 187~ 
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Aquinas' attempt to unite philosophy and theology is just 
as inescapable as the medieval cathedral's attempt to unite this 
world and the next, or . ugustine's attempt to unite the two 
cities . He set out to tackle this problem from the thoroughly 
Christian presupposition that God has created the world, and 
that, consequently, truth, if it were genuine, could not help 
but lead man's mind to his Creator. Truth was, therefore, 
truth, even if it came from the hands of pagans and infidels. 
~uinas began with nature and science, not, as had Augustine, 
with the human soul and history . From t~ere he worked his way ~ 
up from nature to man and finally to God . God thus became the 
final cause or end which gave all else its meaning 
Thus far, and in this manner, Aristotle would have argued; 
but Aquinas now went beyond Aristotle, whom he believed incom-
plete rather than wrong. In order for God to give real meaning 
to anything He had to be the Source of its being as well as the 
end of its stri~ing. In other words He had to be Creator, and ~ 
not j ust final cause . ' ~he goal of life thus became, for Thomas, 
the knowledge and vision of God, to which all else was secondary. 
And such a vision could only be completed in the next lifel 
onsequently, for Aquinas, philosophy was secondary to 
·~~~~~---~ ha separ~ (Averroes) or parallel (Augustin ) 
o identical Neoplatonism) . I 1 his applica 1on o e 
Greek hierarc ical p ·~~·ple to the Christian concept of God as 
the Source of all being which was Aquinas' great contribution. 
He was thus able to bring together under the standard of Chris-
tian thought the two main ideas of Aristotle, that of organism 
(in which nothing can have a separate existence apart ffOm ever~ 
thing else) and l:!_ierarchM (in which everything depends for its 
meaning and existence upon the thing above it) . Thus also he 
was able to unite aith and reason because he saw them both as 
equatlY the gift of God . Such, in briefest outline, is what is 
called the Thomistic synthesi~ 
We can illustrate the Thomistic harmony between religion 
and philosophy, faith and reason, in a number of different ways.~ 
For example, God created the world out of nothing, according to 
Aquinas . The world has since maintained a semi-independent 
existence. This view contrasts with Augustine's belief that the 
world depends directly on the will of God for its continuing ex-
istence . tlPr Aquinas the world is sustained by the presence in 
it of Aristotle's universal forms which are neither separate ~ 
from the world nor dependent upon it . He thus avoided both the 
extreme positions of realism and nominalism, as they were called 
in his time. For nominalism, nothing really existed except in-
dividual things, and the forms or universals were only names 
given them for our convenience. For realiSm, nothing really ex-
isted except the universals 1 and individual things lost their 
uniqueness . By insisting, with Aristotle, that the universals 
were both in and above the world he was able to maintain the 
view that we can come to know the world by means of our unaided 
experience and reason . He believed that we could even go so far 
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as to p r ove t hat his wor l d ~ould no t exist i ndep e ~ently of 
its Creator .• but more than t his we cannot pr ove -- we cannot ~ 
prove that God ha d t o c r eate anyth1.ng . Aquinas p oved the 
necessity fo r the existence o f God as Cr eator by means of the 
five ' p r oofs whi ch are given in one o f m1r sel e ct i on0 
If we can prove t hat this world is ot sel f- sust a ining we 
can als o pr ove t hat hmnan be i ngs, sinner s as he y are be cau se of 
Adam 's fal l , are i ncap able of s aving thems l ves . The r efor e man 
is i n need of s ometh ing more t ha n c an be ga ined by h is own ef-
forts , He is in ne ed o f a Sa v io" Bu t man canno t p r ove that 
God must answer t h is need, mu s give him the gift of s alvation. 
A saVI'OUr whose existence a nd activity c©ul d be p r oven by reason 
would be l imi t ed t o and by the ver y reas on wh ich had p r ove d his 
ne cess ity , I f man c o l d prove that someone had t o g i ve him a 
gi f t it wou l d no longer be a gift , ffhe:r:·e f ore,-man can no more 
prove tha t God m s t save him t han he can pr ove that He had to ~ 
create him-;:J 
h is b r ings Aquinas t.o t:he l evel or dimens ion of f a ith. 
He believed t hat beyond the fir·s and final cause, whi c h we can 
prove, there e x ists a no t her a nd ever. higher a spect o f God which 
is reveal e _ to us .. Aquinas r efer s t o t his higher aspect of God 
as the "God an- Father o f o • r Lor d Jes~ s Christ." Thi s is the 
Saviour God, t he God o f t he Incarnation and the Trini t y , This ~ 
leve l of fa i th, a lthough i t c anno t be p r oven, i s jus t a s neces-
sary and jus t as :real as anyth i ng that :t··e a.son can p r ove . Fur-
thermore, beca·a faith is the gift of Go d al so the Cre-
ator ~we.l"S , Q.Q....""ir.ad c · b r~:t-he~ 
~tes ang_fulfills is t he ork of t he Church to con-~~~~~~=z~~~~~~ 
ser ve and pas s on 
We can s ee the same c ombination o f fai th and reason in 
Aquinas ' tea ching abou t l aw . An intel l igible wor ld mu s t be 
gover ned by law . It canno t be r~led y chance , Indeed, for 
Aquinas , the two words " __ ule" and " chance" a e l o g i<rJally incom-
patible with each other , Law f o r him is t he p r i nciple which 
governs corpor a t e o r orga nic huma n actions , As s u ch it in-
structs men i n t he ways t hat t hey s h o ld ac t i n o r der to attain 
human h~iness , Because God i s man ' s C:rea t o r He i s a lso his 
Ru ler , ~~a t God does no t rul E! a :rb i trarily; He rul es a ccor ding 
to l aw which is knowable by ma n ' s unaided huma n reason , Here 
again Aqu inas d i f fere d from Augustine , who had ins is ted that in 
the fall both man ' s reaso n and will were c orrupte d . Aqu inas v 
believed t hat only man's wi l l was c orrup ted, a nd t hat t herefore 
man's r eas on , even that o f the i nfidel was cap abl e of knowing 
the l aws of Go~ 
her e are, a ccor d ing t o Aqui ~as > f o r laws b y which God 
rule the wor l d . The fi r st is the ete nal l aw, accor ing to 
which He c reated t he wor ld , The secon ~he n~~ aw, 
which i s the e ternal law as it is imprint ed on a ll cre a ted 
be i n gs a nd accor ding t o whi ch they have a natu r a l tendency 
towar d a c t ions whi c h a e p r oper t o themselves , The thir d of 
-L 1h4 ci.M4t ~~ hunta/. .I --nt' ?J7/. 
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these, the human law, is derived from the natural law and makes 
clear ~ow the na t u r al law is to be applied in different times , 
places, and circumstances. The human law is to govern the 
specific acts of historical men for the common good and, as 
such, it includes the old Roman ius gentium and ius civile. 
Human society , like nature, is governed by this rational law ~ 
which defines those things which are contrary to nature. Murder 
is contrary to nature and the natural law , but we need some such 
means as the human law to distinguish between murder and man-
slaughter. And further, if this is to be a real distinction and 
not an arbitrary one, it must be based on reason. Human soci-
ety, viewed this way, does not depend either on the will of God 
or on the wills of men for its reason and law. And anyone who 
tries to break these laws is, in effect, trying to break the 
laws of God. The fourth and final law is the divine law, the 
gift of revelation and grace, which is applied oman s inner 
motivation or will and thus completes the other thre~ 
Aquinas' definition of law illustrates well the balance in 
his thinking as well as his unique combination of hierarchy and 
organism, within a Christian framework. This very balance is 
probably why his thought was little used in the contemporary 
controversies between church and state . While his completed 
definition of law as "an ordinance of reason for the common 
good, ma.de by him who has the care of the community, and promul-
gated" does make room for the institutions of church and state , 
he was most concerned with_the problems of religion and the in-
stitution of the Church. ~an needs, he argues, the authority of 
God his Creator, speaking through the Scriptures, interpreted 
by the popes , fathers, and councils of the Church, to set him ~ 
straight . In this way the faith which is transmitted by the 
Church serves to save and redeem him , without ever running 
counter to reaso . 
Another illustration of Aquinas' synthesis ·-s.1f"lie taken 
from his ethics. ccording to him it is possible ~0 prove by 
means of reason tlie desirability of the old Greek v irtues of 
courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom. By means of reason 
we can prove, contrary to Augustine's belief, that these vir-
t u es are necessary for men as the social creatures they reall 
are , organic parts of human society. But Aquinas also believed, 
and in this he agreed with Augustine, that it is impossible to 
achieve the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love (charity) 
without the infusion of the grace of God through the sacraments 
of the Church.) 
A final illustration of this unique combination may be 
taken from the method that Aquinas used, especially in the 
Summa Theologica. He starts in the disputational manner by 
carefully defining and narrowing the question to be discussed. 
He next lists the arguments against the question as he has 
framed it, arguments which he calls objections. He then goes 
on to give the answers of authority. But he does not rely on 
authority alone. He uses reason to prove the correctness of 
( 
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his authority. Then he goes on to answer the objections with 
which he started. Thus Aquinas can begin as Abelard did, with 
divergent answers to many of the questions of his day, but he 
goes beyond the Sic et Non to a conclusion in agreement at one 
and the same time witli DOth faith and reason. 
~ considering the thought of Aquinas one point should alwa~--be kept in mind. For all his insistence on the need for 
reason and philosophy, he never asserted that these . wer~ neces-
sary for one's s~lvation. Religion, faith, and salvation could 
never depend on a certain amount of intellectual attainment. To 
do so would be to deny heaven to all but . bachelors, masters , and 
doctors, something which would run counter to the teachings of ~ 
the New Testament . Perhaps this is one of the ·reasons why, for 
all his intellectual attainments, Aquinas was called the Angelic 
Doctor~ • 
The synthesis which St. Thomas Aquinas achieved represented 
the most important bid of the medieval Church for the intellectual 
leadership of Christendom. In his own time it was criticized as 
the "via moderna" and challenged from many sides. The Church 
seemea-unable to devise an intellectual expression of its doc-. 
trine that would go unquestioned. The forces which were to at-
tack Thomism and to weaken and finally break up the Church were 
already at work in his own day. Meanwhile, the universities 
turned their attention to other problems, survived the break-up 
of the Middle Ages, and maintained an unbroken existence down to 
our own time. Nevertheless , Aquinas' thought stands as one of 
the major contributions of the Middle Ages to the Western World. 
It is a magnificent illustration of the sheer power of the human 
mind and the basis for the intellectual expression of the Roman 
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Summa The o l ogica ~ 
Fir s t Par t 
Qu estion I 
The Nature and Extent of Sacr ed Doctri ne 
III p . 43 
To place ou r purpose within p r oper limits, we first 
endeavour to inves tigate the naLu re and extent of this 
sacred doct r ine . Conce r ning t h i s ther e a r e ten points 
of inquiry ~ --
( 1 ) Whether it is necessary? ( 2 ) Whethe r it is a 
science? ( 3 ) Whethe r i t i s one o r ma ny? 4 ) Whether 
it is speculative or p rac t ical? ( 5) How it is compared 
with other sciences? ( 6 ) Whether it is the same as 
wisdom? (7 ) Whe t he r God is i t s s u bjec_t-matter? 
(8 ) Whether it is a ma tter of a r gument? ( 9 ) Whether 
it r ightly employs me t aphor s a nd similes? ( 10) Whether 
the Sacr ed Sc i pture o f this doctrine may be expounded in 
d ifferent senses? 
Fi r st Ar ticle . Whethe r , besides philosophy, any further 
doctr ine is r equ i r ed? 
We proceed t hu s t o t he First Ar ti cle : --
00ject1on l~t-seems t hat, beside s philosophical 
science, we have no need of a ny further knowledge. For 
man should not seek t o know what is above r eason : Seek 
not t he things that a r e t oo high for thee (Ecclus . ~ 
"2"2T . ---su t whatever is not abov~ r easollTS fully treated 
of in philosophical science . crhe refore any other knowledge ~ 
besides philosophical science is s u per fluou s . 
Obj . 2 . Fur ther, knowledge can be concerned only with 
being~or-nothing c a n be k n own, save what is true; and all 
that is, is true . ~ut ever ything t hat is, is treated of 
i n philosophical sci e nce -- e ven God Himself; so that there 
is a part of philosophy called t he ology, o r the divine ~ 
science, as Ar istoLl e has prove d Metaph . vi .). Therefore, 
besides philosophical science , t here is no need of any 
furthe r knowledge~ 
On t he contrary, I t is wr i t t e n ( 2 Tim . i ii . 16) : All 
Scr ipture inspir ed o f God is p r o f itable to teach, to re~ 
prove, t o correc t, t o Tilstrct in j u st1ce. Now Scripture, 
1nsp1rea-o£ God, is-no part of pni losophical science, 
which has been built u p by human r eas on . Therefore it is 
usefu l that beside s phi l osophical science t her e ~hould be 
other knowledge -- i . ~ ., inspi r ed o f God . 
I answer t hat ,-l t was ne c essar y for man as salvation that 
there-should be-a-knowledge r evealed by God, besides phil-
osophical science built p 'by human reas on . Firstly, in-
deed, becau se man i s di r ected t o God, as to a n end that 
* The "Su mma Theologica" of St . Thomas Aquinas, trans . Fathers 
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publishers and of Benziger Br o her s, Inc . 
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s u rpasses the grasp of his reason; The eye hath not seen, 
0 God , besides Thee, what t hings Thou hast preparea ror-
them that wa1t ror-Thee-Tisa. lxi~)~ut the end must 
fi r s t -ne-known Qrffien-wlio are to direct their though t s and 
actions to the end . Hence it was necessary for the salva-
tion of man that certain truths which exceed human reason 
shou ld be made k nown to him by divine revelation. Even 
as r egar ds those truths abou t God which human reason could 
have discover ed, it was necessary that man should be taught 
by a divine revelation ; because the truth about God such 
as r eason could discover , would only be known by a few, 
and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many 
err ors . Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, 
depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in 
order that the salvat ion of men might be brou ght about 
more fitly and more s u rely, it was necessar y that they 
shou ld be taught divine t ruths by divine revelation . It 
was the r e fo r e necessar y that, besides philosophical science 
bu ilt up by reason ther e should be a sacr ed science learnt 
throu gh revelation . 
Reply Obj . 1 . Althou gh those things which are beyond 
man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his 
reason , nevertheless, once they are r evealed by God they 
mu st be accepted by faith . Hence the sacred text continues, 
For many things are shown to thee above the understanding 
~man-TEcclus . TIT . 25) . -xna-rn this tne-sacred science 
conSISts . 
Reply Obj. 2. Sciences are differentiated according to 
the var 1ous means through which knowledge is obtained. For 
the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same 
conclusion -- that the earth, for instance, is round: the 
astronomer by means of mathematics (i . e., abstracting from 
matter) , but the physicist by means of-matter itself . 
Hence ther e is no reason why those things which may be 
lear nt from philosophical science, so far as they can be 
known by natu ral reason, may no t also be taught us by an-
other science so far as they fall within revelation . Hence 
theology included in sacred doctrine differ s in kind from 
that theology which is par t of philosophy . 
Qu estion II 
The Existence of God 
Because t he chie i aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the 
knowledge of God, no t only as He is in Himself, but also 
as He is the beginni ng of things and their last end, and 
especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has 
been already said, therefore, in our endeavour to expound 
this science, we shall treat : (1) Of God: ( 2 ) Of the 
rational creature's advance towards God : (3 ) Of Christ , 
Who as man, is our way to God . 
In treating of God ther e will be a thr eefold division : --
For we shall consider (1) Whatever concer ns the Divine 
Essence . (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons. 
I ( 
( 
III p. 45 
( 3 ) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from 
Him . I • 
Concern~g the Divine Essence, we must consider : --
( 1 ) Whe tber God exists? (2) The manner of His ex-
istence, or , r a ther, what is not the manner ~f His exist-
ence . ( 3 ) Whatever concerns 1IIS operations ~- namely, 
His knowledge, wil l, power . 
Concer ni ng ~he fi r st, there are thr ee points of in-
. .. .... qu J.ry : --
(1) Whether the p r oposition ' God exists ' is self-
e vident? (2) Whether it j s demonstraqle? (3 ) Whether 
God exists? ' 
First Ar ticle . Whether the existence of God is self-
evident? 
We pr oceed thus to the Fir st Article : --
UE,jection 1:--Tt-seems that the existence of God is 
self-evldent . Now those things ar e said to be self-
evi dent t o us t he knowledge of which is naturally im-
pl anted in- us, as we can see in regar d to first principles . 
Bu t as Damascene says (De Fid . Orth . i . I, 3) , the kno~· 
ledge of God is naturallY TmPlanied in all . Therefore 
the exTSt ence-oi:God is self-evident-.----
Obj . 2 . Further, those things are said to be self-
evide~whTch are known as soon as the terms are known, 
which the Philosopher ( I Poster. iii. ~ says is true of 
the fi r st principles of demonstration , Thus, when the 
nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once 
r ecogniz' d that every whole is greater than its part . 
Bu t as soon as the signification of the wor d ' God' is 
under stood, it is at once seen that God exists . For by 
this worq is signified that thing than which nothing 
gr eater can be conceived . But that which exists actually 
and mentally is greater than that which exists only men-
tally . ~herefore, since as soon as the word 'God v is 
under stoQd it exists mentally, it also follows that it 
exists aqtually . Therefor e the proposition 'God exists' 
is self-.vident . 
Obj ! 3o Further, the existence of truth is self-
evide~ · For whoever denies t he existence of .truth 
grants that t r uth does not exist: and, if truth does ,not 
exist, then the proposi tion ' Truth does not exist' is 
t r ue : and if there is Rnything true, there must be truth . 
But God ' ~s truth itselt : I am the way, the truth, and 
the life (John xi v . · 6) . Tlierefore- 'GOd exists' is self-
evident . · 
On the contrar y, No one can mentally admit the oppos-
ite or-wnat is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph . 
iv . , lect . vi . ) states concerning the first principles of 
demonstr ation . But the opposite of the proposition 'God 
is w can be mentally admitted : The fool said in his he'art, 
There is no God (Ps . lii . 1). ~refore, that:Goa-exists 
l.S not-seTI-evident . 
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of 
two ways ; on tne-0ne harid , self-evident in itself, though 
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not to u s ; on the o ther, self-evident in itself, and to 
us . A p r oposit i on i s self-evident because the predicate 
is included in the essence of the s ubj ect, as 'Man is an 
animal, ? for animal i s contained in the essence of man. 
If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be 
known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; 
as is clear with r e gard to the first principles of demon-
stration, the terms of which are common things that no 
one is ignorant of, s u ch as being and non-being, whole and 
part, and suchl ike . If, however , there are some to whom 
the essence of the pr edi cate and subject is u nknown, the 
proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to 
those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and 
subject of the propos ition . Ther efore, it happens, as 
Boethius says ( Hebdom . , t he title of which is : 'Whether 
all that is, is good' ) , 'that there are some mental con-
cepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incor-
poreal s u bstances a r e not in space . ' Therefore I say 
that this proposition, ' God exists,' of itself is self-
evident, for the p r edicate is the same as the subject; 
because God is His own existence as will be hereafter 
shown (Q . III . , A. 4) . Now because we do not know the 
essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to 
us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more 
known to us, though less known in their nature -- namely, 
by effects . 
Reply Obj . 1 . To know that God exists in a general 
and confuseaway-is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch 
as God is man's beat itude . For man naturally desires 
happiness, and what is natur ally desired by man must be 
naturally known to him . This, however, is not to know 
absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone 
is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is 
approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; 
for many the r e are who imagi ne that man's perfect good 
which is happiness , consists in riches, and others in 
pleasures, and others in something else . 
Reply Obj , 2 . Perhaps not everyone who hears this 
word 'God' understands it to signify something than which 
nothing greater can be thought , seeing that some have 
believed God to be a body . Yet, granted that everyone 
understands that by this word 'God ' is signified something 
than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, 
it does not therefore follow that he understands that 
what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it 
exists mentally . Nor can it be argued tha t it actually 
exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists 
something than which nothing greater can be thought; and 
this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God 
does not exist . 
Reply Obj . 3 . The existence of truth in general is 
self-eviden~but the existence of a Primal Truth is not 
self-evident to us. 
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Second Article . Whether it can be demonstrated that God 
exists? 
We p r oceed thus to the Second Article : --
ODjection 1-.---It seems that the ex1stence of God cannot 
be demonstrated-:- For it is an article of faith that God 
exists . But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, be-
cause a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; where-
as faith is of t he u nseen (Heb . xi . l ). Therefore it can-
not be demonstrated that God exists. 
Obj , 2 . Further , the essence is the middle term of 
demonstratTon . But we cannot know in what God's essence 
consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Dama-
scene says (De Fid . Orth . i . 4 ), Therefore we cannot dem-
onstrate tha~Goa-exists . 
Obj . 3 . Fur ther, if the existence of God were demon-
stratecl," t1iis could only be from His effects. But His 
effects are not p r opor tionate to Him, since He is infinite 
and His effects are fi nite; and between the finite and 
infinite there is no proportion , Therefore, since a 
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportion-
ate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be 
demonstrated . 
On the contr a r y, The Apostle says : The invisible 
things-o~im are clear ly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made (Rom .~20). But this woula-not be 
unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through 
the things that are made; for the first thing we must know 
of anything is, whether it exists . 
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: 
One is through~ cause, and is called a priori, and 
this is to argue from what is prior absolutely . The other 
is through the effect, and is called a demonstration a 
posteriori; this is to argue from what is prior relatTvely 
only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its 
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the 
cause . And from every effect the existence of its proper 
cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are bet-
ter known to us; because since every effect depends upon 
its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. 
Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-
evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His ef-
fects which are known to us , 
Reply Obj . l , The existence of God and other like 
truths abou t God~ which can be known by natural reason, 
are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the art-
icles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge , even as 
grace presupposes nature , and perfection supposes some-
thing that can be perfected . Nevertheless, there is 
nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, ac-
cepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself 
is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated. 
Reply Obj , 2 , When the existence of a cause is dem-
onstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of 
the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's 
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existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, 
because, in order to p r ove the existence of anything, it 
is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of 
the word, and not its essence, for the question of its 
essence follows on the question of its existence. Now 
the names given to God are derived from His effects; con-
sequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His 
effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of 
the word 'God. ' 
Reply Obj . 3 . From effects n~t proportionate to the 
cause no perfect-knowledge of that cause can be obtained. 
Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be 
clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the ex-
istence of God from His effects; though from them we can-
not perfectly know God as He is in His essence . 
Third Article . Whether God exists? 
We proceed fhus t o t he Thi r d Article : --
00ject1on l~t-seems that God does not exist; because 
if one two contraries infinite, the other wou 
be alto ether destro But the word 'God' means that He is 
infinite goodness . If, therefore, God existed, there would 
be no evil discovera e; but there is evil in the world. ~ 
Therefore God~oes not exisJ) 
Obj . 2 , LEUrther~ it is s u perfluous to suppose that what 
can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced 
by many . But it seems that everything we see in the world 
can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God 
did not exist . i'or all natur al things can be reduced to 
one principle, wElch is nature; and all voluntary things ~ 
can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or 
:~~~ ~~ ~~se:: ~e~~~~~;d'w~ 
_ On th¢~o6trary, It is sa?~in -the person of God: I am 
Whol am-(Exod . iii . 14) . ---
--- -r answer that, The existence of God can be proved in 
five wa s . --
e first and nore manifest way is the argument from ,_,. 
motio It is cer tain, and evident to our senses, that 
in the world some things are in motion . Now whatever is 
in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be 
in motion except it is in potential.i ty t .o that towards 
which it is in ~tion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as 
it is in act . ~r motion is nothing else than the redq -
tion of something from potentiality to actualityl But 
nothing !!Otcan be reduced from potentiality to auiiality, 
except by something in a state of actuality. bus that / 
which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, w ich is po-
tentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and 
changes it Now it is not possible that the same thing 
should be at once in actu ality and potentiality in the 
same respect, but only in different respects. For what 
is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; 
but it is simultaneously potentially cold . It is there-
fore impossible that in the same respect and in the same 
w::~~::Jf;~.;. :-A4-~(~~~~~ 
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way a thing should be both mover and moved, i . e , , that it 
should move itself , fthe r efor e, whatever is Tn-motion must 
be put in mot i on by another . If that by which it is put 
in motion be itself pu t in motion, then this also must 
needs be put in motion by another , and that by another 
again . But this cannot go on to infinity , because then 
there would be no fi r st mover , and, consequ ently, no other 
mover; seeing that s u bsequent mover s move only inasmuch as 
they are put in motion by the fi r st mover; as the st\if 
moves only because it is put in motion by the hand . J,there-V 
fore it is necessary to a rr ive a t a first mover, put in 
motion by no othe r ; and thi s ever yone understands to be 
Go~ ~~-
, e __§ecGmd way i s f r om the natur e of the efficient ~ 
cause · (!E the world o f sense we find there is an order 
of effic1ent cau s e s.::J Ther e is no case known (neither is 
it inde · e ) · which a thin is found to be the 
efficient c so it wou to 
itself, which is impossible . Now in efficient cau~ it 
rs not ossible to n t o i n finit ' because in all ef-
ficie causes fol ing in or der, the first is the cause 
of the intermediate ca ~e, and the inte a 
u..:.~~L_J..J..L~~u~l~t::_;i~m!!:a!:U:t.x...e c ause , whether the intermediate 
~~~~~~~~~o~r~~o~n~e~~ly . Now to take away t~ 
cause is to take away the effect . Therefore, if there be 
no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no 
ultimate , nor any inter mediate cause . But if in efficient 
causes it is poss i ble to go on to infinity, there will be 
no first effici ent cause, neither will there be an ulti-
mate effect, nor any interme~ate efficient causes; all 
of which is plainly false . ~refore it is necessary to 
admit a fi r st efficient cause, to which everyone gives 
the name of Go~ 
~e thi~ way is taken f r om possibility and necessity, 
and r uns thu~ We f ind i n nature t hings that are possible 
to be and not to be, s i nce they are fou nd to be genera ted, 
and to corrupt, and -consequ ently, they are possible to be 
and not to be . Bu t it is impossible for these always to 
exist, fo r that which is possible not to be at some time 
is not . ~erefore, if ever ything is possible not to be, 
then at one time ther e cou ld have been nothing in exist-
ence . Now if this wer e t rue, even now ther e would be 
nothing in e x istence, becau se that which does no t exist 
only begins t o e.xist by something already existing . There- y 
fore, if at one time nothing was in e x istence, it would 
have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; 
and thus even now nothing would be in existence -- which 
is absur~ Ther efore, not all beings are merely possible, 
but there must exist something the existence of which is 
necessary , But ever y necessar y thing either has its ne-
cessity caused by another, or not . Now it is impossible 
to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their 
necessity caused by anot her , as~_ been already proved 
in regard to efficient causes . e r efor e we cannot but ~ 
postula~~~~he existence of some eing having of itself ~~:T~~.~~~~ (Tn.£_~~~/ /~~~ ~ 
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its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but 
rather causing in others their necessity. This all men ~ 
speak _of as Godl 
~e four~way is taken from the gradation to be found ~ 
in things ~ Among beings there are some more and some less 
good, tr~ noble, and the like , CJLut 'more' and 'less' 0 / zt~~ 
are predicated of different things, according as they re- o?/~ -~ 
semble in their different ways something which is the max- 10 
imum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more~~~ 
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so tha t there is ~
something which is truest, something best, something nob- ~L 
lest , and, consequently, somethi ng which is uttermost ~ ~~ 
being ; for those t hings that are greatest in truth ~e ~ ~~. 
greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. ow 
the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that 
genus; as fire, whi ch is the maximum of heat, is the 
cause of all hot thi ngs . Therefore there must also be ~ 
something which is to all beings the cause of their being 
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call Go~~ 
~e fifth way is taken from the governance of the wo:~~ 
We s~ that things which lack intelligence, such as natural 
bod1es, act for an end , and t · t f o ir 
actin alwa s, or near! always, in the same way, so as to 
obtain the be esult . Hence it is plain that not for-
tuitously, but desi gne y, do they achieve their end. ow 
whatever lacks intelligence cannot move .,towards an end, 
unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge ~ 
and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the 
archer . (therefore some intelligent being exists by whom 
all natural thin~ are directed to their end; and this 
bein~e call Go~ 
J§:ply Obj . ! · ~s Augustine says (Enchir . xi . ): Since 
God ~ the highest good , He would not allow any evil to ~ / 
exis~in His works ,-unless-His omnTPQtence ana-goooness y 
were such as to bring good even out of evil~his is part 
~he 1nf1nite goodness of-coG,~a~He-should allow evil 
to exist, and out of it p roduce good~ 
eply Obj . 2 . Since nature wo~s for a determinate end 
under t e d1rectTon of a higher agent, whatever is done by 
nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first 
cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be 
traced back to some higher cause other than human reason 
or will, since t hese can change and fail; for all things 
that are changeable and cap able of defect must be traced 
back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, 
as was shown in the body of the Article~ 
